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I. INTRODUCTION
In the film The Graduate, Mr. McGuire advises Benjamin
Braddock - a recent college graduate struggling with his future plans -
that "there's a great future in plastics."' While Mr. McGuire meant
plastic products, another form of "plastic" - debit cards - has emerged
as "the most frequently used noncash payment method" in the United
States.2 With debit cards accounting for 37.9% of noncash payments in
2009,3 banks receive a significant amount of their revenue from debit
card interchange fees. 4 However, according to Illinois Senator Richard
Durbin, the interchange system "is entirely unregulated" with "no
competition and no recourse for merchants exploited by the rate
structure and fees."5
Senator Durbin was influential in placing a last minute addition
to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
which was signed into law on July 21, 2010.7 This addition, known as
1. THE GRADUATE (Embassy Pictures 1967).
2. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,395 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
3. See Nancy Donahue et al., The 2010 Federal Reserve Payments Study, Fed. Reserve
Sys. 4 (Apr. 5, 2011),
http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/press/2010_paymentsstudy.pdf.
4. See Letter from Trade Ass'n on Fed. Reserve's Proposed Rule on Section 920 of the
Dodd-Frank Act to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. 10
(Feb. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Trade Ass'n Letter], available at
http://electronicpaymentscoalition.org/downloads/Trade%20Associations%20Comment%20
Letter%20on%20Federal%20Reserve's%20Proposed%2ORule%20on%20Section%20920%
20oP/o20the%2ODodd-Frank%2OAct[1].pdf (stating that debit card interchange fees
amounted to $16.2 billion in bank revenue in 2009).
5. See Letter from Senator Richard J. Durbin, U.S. Senate, to Camden Fine, President
and CEO of Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am. and Dan Mica, President and CEO of Credit
Union Nat'l Ass'n (June 11, 2010),
http://durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=d9c42bd5-b945-4bee-b025-
55aab2fd586a [hereinafter Durbin Letter].
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
7. See Tim Chen, What the Durbin Amendment Means for You, U.S. NEWS (July 12,
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the "Durbin Amendment," attempts to make interchange fees charged
for debit card purchases "reasonable and proportional" to the cost
incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction.8  The final rule
from the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) requires the interchange
transaction fees on debit card purchases to be a base of twenty-one cents
plus a small ad valorem fee,9 and if the debit card issuer is eligible, one
cent per transaction can be added to cover fraud prevention costs.' 0
Previously, interchange fees had averaged forty-four cents per
transaction for all debit cards."
This Note will examine the effect the implementation of the
Durbin Amendment will have on the banking industry, focusing on the
Fed's lack of regulatory power over debit card payment networks and
its potential negative impact on the exemption for banks with under $10
billion in assets. Part II will provide a brief overview of the debit card
industry and interchange fees. 12 Part III will analyze the effect of the
Durbin Amendment on debit card interchange fees and on the
relationship between banks - forced to cope with the loss of transaction
fee revenue - and customers, as well as the small bank exemption
within the Durbin Amendment. 13 Part IV will evaluate the potential
negative effect the Durbin Amendment could have on small banks
despite the exemption,14 while Part V will take a look at the future of
the Durbin Amendment.'5 This Note will demonstrate that the Fed's
failure to require payment card networks to have a two-tier interchange
system could negate the proposed benefits from the exemption for
smaller banks. Payment card networks - such as MasterCard 6 and
2011), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/2011/07/12/what-the-durbin-
amendment-means-for-you.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2 (Supp. IV 2010).
9. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,420 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
10. See id. at 43,404.
11. See id. at 43,397.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See MasterCard Says It Will Implement Two-Tier Interchange System, Michigan
Credit Union League & Affiliates (Aug. 18, 2011),
http://www.mcul.org/NewsArticle_888.html?id=4697.
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Visa17 - have committed to a two-tier interchange structure, but even
with the FTC examining their implementation of the small bank
exemption,' these networks could ultimately reevaluate their decisions.
II. DEBIT CARDS AND INTERCHANGE FEES
A. Evolution ofDebit Cards
Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) were introduced in the late
1960s and 1970s to provide customers with a new way to spend the
money in their deposit accounts. 19 These machines were accessed by
cards, which allowed banks to process fewer checks and customers to
access their money without dealing with bank tellers. 20 By the 1980s,
banks began issuing debit cards that could be used at ATMs and that
could be used for purchases at retailers, with the funds deducted directly
from the customer's deposit account.2'
Unlike credit cards, which allow for short-term borrowing by
the customer from the issuing bank, these bank-issued debit cards draw
funds directly from the bank account linked to the card.22 Therefore,
instead of having to pay off a balance at the end of the month or being
subject to interest charged by the issuing bank for the extension of
credit, the amount of money in your account decreases with each debit
17. See Sean Sposito, Visa Plans Two-Tiered Interchange Rates After Fed Rules, AM.
BANKER, Jan., 2011, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/bulletins/-1031142-
1.html.
18. See Kevin Wack, Durbin Seeks to Beef Up Small-Bank Interchange Exemption, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 1, 2011, available at
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_212/durbin-interchange-debit-fee-ftc-collusion-
1043734-1.html.
19. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,395 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
20. See Stephen Craig Mott, Industry Facts Concerning Debit Card Regulation Under
Section 920, 2 (Oct. 29, 2010) (unpublished report),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/merchants_payment-coalitionmeeting_20
101 102.pdf [hereinafter Mott Report].
21. See Stan Sienkiewicz, The Evolution of EFT Networks from A TMS to New On-Line
Debit Payment Products, Payment Cards Center of the Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
(Apr. 2002), http://www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-
papers/2002/EFTNetworks_042002.pdf (illustrating that debit cards allowed consumers to
receive cash back in addition to paying for their purchases at supermarkets).
22. See Jennifer Barrett, Credit and Debit Cards: What You Need to Know, N.Y. TIMEs
(Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/your-money/credit-and-debit-
cards/primercards.htm.
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card transaction.23
B. Growth ofDebit Card Volume
Over the past decade, debit card use has increased "more than
any other form of electronic payment." 24  In 2003, the worldwide
aggregate dollar volume of Visa debit cards exceeded that of Visa credit
cards.25 Also, as of 2006, Visa debit cards accounted for more
transactions than Visa credit cards.26 From 2006 to 2009, debit cards
use increased from 25% to 37.9% of all non-cash payments, with a
compound annual growth rate of 14.8%.27
Debit cards clearly have a very significant impact on the U.S.
payment system. Debit cards are used more than every other payment
method besides cash and are accepted at about eight million merchant
locations in the U.S.2 9 The percentage of U.S. households using debit
cards increased from 20% in 1995 to 71% by 2007.30 In 2009, there
were 37.7 billion debit and prepaid debit card transactions worth $1.45
trillion.3 1 The number of debit cards in circulation has grown from 235
million in 2000 to a projected 585 million in 2011.32
Of these projected 585 million debit cards, there are two
23. See id; Fukimo Hayashi et al., A Guide to the ATM and Debit Card Industry, Fed.
Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Apr. 7, 2003),
http://info.worldbank.orgletools/docs/library/83934/HayashiApril2003.pdf (noting that
debit card usage has recently increased because of the ease in adding a debit function to an
ATM card, aggressive marketing by banks, and the emergence of offline debit cards from
MasterCard and Visa).
24. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,395 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
25. See Arnold S. Rosenberg, Better Than Cash? Global Proliferation of Payment
Cards and Consumer Protection Policy, 44. CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 520, 525 (2006).
26. Id. at 526.
27. See Donahue, supra note 3, at 4.
28. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,395 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
29. Id.
30. See Trade Ass'n Letter, supra note 4, at 2.
31. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,725
(proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2010-3206 1.
32. See Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2011, U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11sl86.pdf (last visited Jan. 12,
2012).
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primary types of debit authentication: Personal Identification Number
(PIN)-based and Signature-based. 33  "Online" PIN debit cards, which
require a PIN to be entered, allow for money to be immediately
withdrawn from a customer's bank account.34 PIN debit networks,
which carry authorization and clearing information in a single message,
are the natural evolution from the original intent of the debit card - to
be an ATM card.
"Offline" Signature debit cards, while first introduced in 1975,
were used far less than PIN-based debit cards until the early 1990s.36
These transactions carry authorization and clearing information in
separate messages37 and typically take at least two days to clear and for
money to be debited.38
C. Debit Card Interchange Fees
1. Debit Card Transactions and Fees
In a typical debit card transaction, the cardholder provides either
a bank-issued debit card or debit card information - including a PIN, if
a PIN debit transaction - to a merchant. 39  Then, an electronic
authorization request is sent from the merchant through the acquirer (the
merchant's bank) to the payment network (such as Visa, Discovery, or
33. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg.; 81,722, 81,723
(proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2010-32061.
34. See Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 528.
35. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,395 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
36. Mott Report, supra note 20, at 5-6 (noting that payment card networks saw a limited
future in signature debit cards because of security issues until Visa, realizing it could lose
$813 million in interchange income if the debit market became entirely PIN debit cards,
created strategies in the early 1990s to push the debit market toward signature debit cards
through "honor all cards" rules that forced merchants accepting Visa credit cards to accept
Visa signature debit cards as well).
37. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,395 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
38. Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 528.
39. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,395 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
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MasterCard). 40  Next, for PIN debit cards, the network contacts the
customer's bank to make sure that sufficient funds exist for the
transaction's value and that the card is not stolen or reported lost.41
However, for signature-based cards, the payment network determines
whether the customer's total purchases over the previous two or three
days are within the bank's preset limit.42  Finally, a message either
approving or declining the transaction is sent back up the chain to the
merchant quickly after the request.43 If approved, PIN-based debit cards
allow for an immediate deduction of funds, but signature debit cards do
not debit a customer's account for two to three days.44
Within this process, debit card interchange transaction fees,
which the Durbin Amendment defines as "any fee established, charged
or received by a payment card network for the purpose of compensating
an issuer for its involvement in an electronic debit transaction," can be
difficult to understand fully.45 When a retailer accepts a debit card as a
customer's form of payment, the merchant pays a "merchant discount
fee" of usually around two percent, of which a portion - interchange -
goes to the bank that issued the debit card.46
With interchange, the customer's bank sends the merchant's
bank the transaction price minus the interchange rate, which is either the
rate set by the payment network or a rate negotiated by the customer's
bank, and the customer's bank keeps the interchange fee.4 7 Interchange
may also be included when the merchant's bank sends the merchant the
transaction price minus the merchant discount fee, which is negotiated
40. See id.; John P. Caskey & Gordon H. Sellon, Jr., Is the Debit Card Revolution
Finally Here?, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Fourth Quarter 1994),
http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/ECONREV/EconRevArchive/1994/4Q94CASK.
pdf (noting that the network links the merchant's bank to the bank issuing the debit card).
41. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,396 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
42. See Caskey & Sellon, Jr., supra note 40.
43. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,395 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
44. See Caskey & Sellon, Jr., supra note 40.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(c)(8) (Supp. IV 2010).
46. See Interchange: What is the Issue?, Electronic Payments Coalition,
http://electronicpaymentscoalition.org/thelssue (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
47. See Interchange: What it is. How it Works., Visa Inc.,
http://www.usa.visa.com/download/merchants/interchange-brochure.pdf (last visited Jan.
12, 2012).
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between the merchant and the merchant's bank.4 8 Merchants are willing
to pay this discount fee to gain access to the payment networks, and the
revenue from interchange is integral in maintaining a debit card
program.49
2. Fees Based on Type of Debit Card
Because PIN-based debit cards are inherently less risky than
signature debit cards or credit cards,so limited interchange fees on PIN
debit transactions became the rule when debit cards were first promoted
for purchasing at the point of sale.51 For most transactions in the 1980s
and early 1990s, the PIN debit networks set interchange fees "at par"
52
with no monetary advantage for merchants or issuers. However, in the
1990s, the interchange fee system began to change.53 Realizing that the
low interchange fees were not encouraging banks to issue PIN-based
debit cards, payment card networks - primarily Visa and MasterCard -
took efforts to increase debit card use and issuance. 54
In the early 1990s, Visa began to actively promote its signature
debit card that charged higher interchange fees more comparable to
48. Id. (noting that the merchant's bank generally pays interchange); see also
Understanding Visa MasterCard Interchange, Merchant Services Inc.,
http://www.merchantservices.cc/topline-moneymakers/understanding-visa-mistercard-
interchange/understanding-visa-mastercard-interchange/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2012)
(illustrating that Visa and MasterCard realize profit from the fees associated with the debit
card process).
49. Interchange: What is the Issue?, supra note 46 (pointing out that interchange funds
reimburse card issuers for such risks as the float on funds and the risk of nonpayment).
50. See Mott Report, supra note 20, at 3 (demonstrating that PIN debit cards allow for
less incidents of fraud, as well as thwarting potential thieves because of the requirement for
a PIN to be entered, and thus, the inherent risk costs associated with PIN debits were low).
51. Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 531 (demonstrating that customers were also not
interested in paying fees for using money from their own accounts); see also Mott Report,
supra note 20, at 4 (noting that "negative," "reverse," or "issuer-paid" interchange fees
originally went from the debit card issuer to the merchant's bank to help repay merchants
for purchasing PIN terminals).
52. Mott Report, supra note 20, at 4 (demonstrating that an "at par" approach to debit
card transactions meant that no subsidy or interchange fee was given to either issuers or
merchants and that this approach was the norm in the debit card industry in the 1980s
through the early 1990s).
53. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,396 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
54. Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 532.
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those of a credit card. Motivated by the potential revenue from the
higher interchange fees of signature debit cards, banks began to push
customers away from PIN debit cards and their low interchange fees.56
MasterCard soon followed Visa's lead and introduced its own signature
debit card. By 1998, signature debit cards were being used in the
majority of debit card transactions in the United States.8 However,
with signature debit card interchange fees higher than PIN debit cards
because of an increased risk of fraud,59 some merchants were upset with
the higher costs associated with these cards.60
While tension between merchants and payment card networks
issuing signature debit cards was not ultimately resolved until 2005,61
the interchange structure changed soon after signature debit cards
became dominant.62 Debit card holders' banks began charging
merchants' banks an interchange fee to pay for keeping up the debit
card network and for allowing the transaction to occur.63 The network
55. See id.; Mott Report, supra note 20, at 7 (showing that the payment network "honor
all cards" rules forced merchants to accept Visa or MasterCard signature debit cards with
their inherent risks of fraud, and as a result of these risks, merchants were subjected to
higher interchange fees).
56. See Mott Report, supra note 20, at 8-9 (illustrating that bank issuance of signature
debit cards increased greatly in the mid-1990s and that some banks even went as far as to
charge customers a fee for PIN debit cards to force use of signature debit cards).
57. Id. at 7-8.
58. Id. at 12 (stating that signature debit cards accounted for about sixty percent of all
debit card transactions in 1998 and that signature debit cards remain the preferred debit card
in the United States as of 2009).
59. Id at 8 (noting that MasterCard's signature debit card had the highest interchange
rates in the debit market when introduced); see also Debit Card Interchange Fees and
Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,740-41 (proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 235), available at http://federalregister.gov/a/2010-32061 (illustrating that
approximately $1.15 billion of fraud losses came from signature debit card transactions and
approximately $200 million fraud losses came from PIN debit card transactions in 2009).
60. See Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 532.
61. See id at 533 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.
2005)) (noting that the payment card network's use of the "honor all cards" rules resulted in
an antitrust lawsuit settlement of $3 billion).
62. See Mott Report, supra note 20, at 12-13 (illustrating that Visa drove up PIN debit
interchange after their signature debit card became issued in large numbers by banks);
Steven C. Salop et al., Economic Analysis of Debit Card Regulation Under Section 920
Exhibit 6 (Oct. 27, 2010) (unpublished report) [hereinafter Salop Report], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/merchantspaymentcoalition meeting_20
101102.pdf (demonstrating that since 1995, signature debit cards have been used in a
majority of debit card transactions with signature cards accounting for 67% of all debit card
transactions in 2009).
63. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the
Limits of Regulation (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10-26, 2010),
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then accounted for the debit card interchange fee in determining each
issuer's and acquirer's "net settlement position."64
Beginning with Visa's purchase of Interlink, a leading PIN debit
network, in 1991, the gap between PIN based debit card interchange
fees and signature fees has narrowed greatly by increases in PIN fees. 65
Because Visa increased interchange fees for PIN based debit cards to a
level more comparable with signature based cards, other PIN debit
networks raised their interchange fee level to keep banks issuing their
particular debit card.66 However, for most of the 1990s, the fees for
PIN-based debit cards remained much lower than the fees associated
with signature debit cards.
Around 2000, PIN-based debit card issuers and networks began
to incorporate an ad valorem component - a percentage based on the
value of the overall transaction - to their traditionally low interchange
fees. 68 Throughout the 2000s, the levels of both fixed and ad valorem
fees were raised. 69 Both signature and PIN debit fees have increased
since 2004, with PIN fees increasing at a faster pace. 70 As of 2010, the
difference between signature and PIN debit card interchange rates has
greatly diminished.7
Debit card interchange fees have been a significant source of
profit for debit card issuing banks, including credit unions.72 Payment
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1624002.
64. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,396 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
65. See Mott Report, supra note 20, at 12-13 (noting that at the time of Visa's purchase
of Interlink, all competing PIN networks either had issuer-based interchange or at par
interchange, but Visa moved Interlink's debit interchange from at par to a fixed value of
$0.45).
66. See id. at 12-14.
67. See Salop Report, supra note 62, at 9.
68. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,396 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861; Mott Report, supra note 20, at 14 (noting that
interchange fees increased by 234% between 1998 and 2006).
69. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,396 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
70. See Id.
71. See Salop Report, supra note 62, at 10 fig. 6.
72. See Adam J. Levitin, Interchange Regulation: Implications for Credit Unions,
FILENE RESEARCH INST., Nov. 24, 2010, at 21-26,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/levitin-filene-Paper.pdf
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card networks reported that, in 2009, $16.2 billion debit card
interchange fees were collected with $12.5 billion from signature debit
card transactions, $3.2 billion from PIN debit, and $0.5 billion from
prepaid cards. As of 2009, the average interchange fee for any debit
card was forty-four cents per transaction, or 1.15% of the average
transaction amount. 74 Debit card issuers received an average of fifty-six
cents per transaction in debit card interchange fees for signature cards,
and an average of twenty-three cents per transaction for PIN debit
cards.
III. THE EFFECT OF THE DURBIN AMENDMENT ON INTERCHANGE FEES
A. Reasons for the Durbin Amendment
Senator Durbin's amendment regulates a system that has
allowed, according to Durbin, for "virtually no competition and no
recourse for merchants exploited by the rate structures and fees" from
payment card networks.76 To regulate the interchange fee system, the
Durbin Amendment intends to set fees at a level "reasonable and
proportional" to the cost of a debit card transaction.77
The Durbin Amendment broadly defines a debit card as any
card "issued or approved for use through a payment card network to
debit an asset account for the purpose of transferring money between
accounts or obtaining goods or services, whether authorization is based
on signature, PIN, or other means."78  However, Senator Durbin
73. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,397 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Durbin Letter, supra note 5. But see Durbin Amendment on Debit Interchange,
ELECTRONIC PAYMENT COALITION,
http://www.electronicpaymentscoalition.org/interchange/fedrule/durbinamendment/ (last
visited Jan. 12, 2012) (stating that there were no hearings, studies, or careful examination of
the Durbin Amendment; no vote in the House of Representatives; no consideration in any
Congressional Committee; and very little discussion of the amendment in the Senate).
77. See Adam J. Levitin, Symposium: Data Security and Data Privacy in the Payment
System: Article: Private Disordering? Payment Card Fraud Liability Rules, 5 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 37 (2010) (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code)); 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(c)(8) (Supp. IV 2010).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(c)(8).
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narrowly defines his purpose in proposing the Durbin Amendment as
hoping to "help small businesses, merchants, and consumers by
providing relief from high interchange fees for debit card
transactions."79 Durbin believed that the current system for interchange
fees created by Visa and MasterCard was "not sustainable" and only
incentivized banks to issue more Visa and MasterCard debit and credit
cards.80
B. Fed's Proposed and Final Rule
In its proposed rule published in December 2010, the Fed
presented two options for implementing the Durbin Amendment: (1)
issuer-specific fees up to a cap with a safe harbor81 or (2) a stand-alone
cap for all issuers.82 Under either alternative, debit card interchange
fees were capped at twelve cents per transaction.83 The Fed determined
that a twelve cent cap was adequate to permit a majority of issuers to
recover all costs incurred in a debit card transaction.84
After publishing its proposed rule, the Fed received over 11,000
comments from payment card networks, merchants, issuing banks,
advocacy groups, and members of Congress.s While merchants and
groups representing such merchants hoped the Fed would lower the
maximum interchange fee cap even lower,86 payment card networks and
issuers protested the lower cap of twelve cents because of lost revenue
and diminished debit card services.87  Ultimately, the Fed's final rule
settled on a higher stand-alone cap.8
79. 156 CONG. REC. S3695 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard
Durbin).
80. Id.
81. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,736
(proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2010-32061.
82. Id. at 81,738.
83. Id. at 81,726.
84. See id. at 81,737 (demonstrating that the Fed conducted a survey of issuers that
showed the average per-transaction cost for a debit card purchase was thirteen cents).
85. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,402 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 43,420.
88. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,404 (stating that the
Fed was adopting a modified form of Alternative 2, the stand-alone cap).
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To set the limitation on interchange fees in the final rule, the
Fed conducted a survey of institutions covered by the new interchange
fee regulation to determine costs related to issuers' debit card
programs.89 Based on the results of this survey,90 the Fed rule limits
interchange fees to a base fee of twenty-one cents per transaction plus
five basis points of the transaction's value.9' For eligible issuers,92 an
additional cent per transaction can be added to cover fraud prevention
costs.93 The Fed's final rule became effective October 1, 201 1.94
C. Durbin Amendment's Small Bank Exemption
The Durbin Amendment provides an exemption for issuers that,
together with its affiliates, have assets of less than $10 billion as of the
end of the previous calendar year.95 The purpose of this exemption was
to prevent "smalltown banks, regional banks, banks that are not the big
boys on Wall Street" from being hurt by the regulation of interchange
89. Id. at 43,432.
90. See id. at 43,432-34. (stating that the Fed included costs incurred in processing debit
transactions, chargeback, and other similar transactions, including processing fees and
monitoring costs, as well as fraud losses, in determining the twenty-one cent base fee; also
demonstrating that the twenty one cent figure corresponds to the eightieth percentile of an
issuer's average per-transaction costs and that five basis points is approximately the median
of issuer fraud losses as determined from the Fed's survey).
91. Id. at 43,404.
92. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,478, 43,483 (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235) (interim final rule, July 20, 2011) (stating that an eligible
issuer must develop and implement policies and procedures designed to prevent fraud and
loss of debit card and cardholder data, and review its fraud-prevention policies and
procedures annually); Bud Hollenkamp, Final Durbin Amendment "Caps" Debit Card
Interchange Fees, FINANCIAL REFORM INSIGHTS (Aug. 2, 2011),
http://www.financialreforminsights.com/2011/08/02/final-durbin-amendment-"caps"-debit-
card-interchange-fees (noting that "an issuer can be eligible if they implement policies and
procedures that identify and prevent fraudulent electronic debit transactions, monitor the
incidence of, reimbursements received for and losses incurred from fraudulent electronic
debit transactions, respond appropriately to suspicious electronic debit transactions to limit
fraud losses and prevent the occurrence of future fraudulent electronic debit transactions,
and secure debit card and cardholder data").
93. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,420 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861; Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed.
Reg. 43,478, 43,483 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235) (interim final rule, July 20, 2011)
(demonstrating that the fraud prevention adjustment of one cent represents the difference
between the median fraud-prevention cost of nearly two cents and the median transactions-
monitoring cost of nearly one cent).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2 (Supp. IV 2010).
95. Id.
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fees.96
The $10 billion threshold will be determined based not merely
by domestic assets, but by worldwide assets.9 7 The Fed will compile
and publish a list of banks above and below the exemption threshold, as
well as collect information about the collection of debit card
interchange fees. 98 These published documents should enable debit card
issuers and Congress to evaluate whether the $10 billion exemption is
having any meaningful effect. 99
The small bank exemption covers almost all American
community banks, credit unions, and savings banks.100 The exemption
from the interchange fee limit applies to 99% of banks, 99% of credit
unions, and 97% of savings banks. 01 An interchange fee exemption is
not permanent, and if an exempt issuer becomes a covered issuer
because of changes in asset size or affiliates, then that debit card issuer
96. 156 CONG. REc. S3697 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard
Durbin).
97. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,435 (July 20,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-
16861 (stating that a debit card issuer qualifies for the exemption if its worldwide banking
and nonbanking assets, including assets of affiliates, other than trust assets under
management, are less than $10 billion).
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. See Small Banks and the Durbin Amendment, MERCHANTS PAYMENTS COALITION,
INC., I
http://www.nacsonline.com/NACS/Government/CreditCardFees/Documents/SmallBanksan
dDurbinAmdt.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2012)[hereinafter Small Banks and the Durbin
Amendment]; DOB: The ABCs of Banking - Banks, Thrifts, and Credit Unions,
CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF BANKING,
http://www.ct.gov/dob/cwp/view.asp?a=2235&q=297886 (last visited Jan. 12, 2012)
(illustrating that commercial banks are chartered and regulated by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, obtain insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and all commercial banks are members of the Federal Reserve System; that
thrift banks are chartered by the Office of Thrift Supervision or state government regulators,
insured by Savings Association Insurance Fund or the Bank Insurance Fund, and have
declined in popularity after the 1980s Savings and Loan scandal; and that credit unions are
formed by people with a common bond, insured by the National Credit Union Share
Insurance Fund, and are usually chartered by the National Credit Union Administration).
101. Small Banks and the Durbin Amendment, supra note 100, at 1 (covering all but 86
banks, 3 credit unions and 19 savings banks in the United States). But see David Morrison &
Claude H. Marx, In a First, Interchange Gained Federal Regulation, CREDIT UNION TrMES
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.cutimes.com/2011/12/18/in-a-first-interchange-gained-federal-
regulation?t-debit-atm-shared-branching (noting that the Raleigh, North Carolina-based
State Employee's Credit Union is not exempt from the regulations of the Durbin
Amendment).
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must begin complying with the Durbin Amendment interchange
standards no later than July 1 of the following year.102
D. Non-Exempt Bank Reaction to the Final Rule
While some see the implementation of the Durbin Amendment
as a step in the right direction, non-exempt banks are scrambling to
make up for revenues lost from the almost fifty percent reduction in
interchange fee revenue.103 Many banks considered elimination of free
checking or imposing explicit changes for using debit cards to make
purchases to try to recoup lost interchange fee revenue.104  In 2009,
roughly 96% of large banks offered some form of free checking, but
these free accounts typically had some restrictions, such as minimum
balances of a relatively large amount. 0 5 In 2011, however, only 34.6%
of big banks offered free checking.106 Banks, such as JPMorgan Chase,
SunTrust, and Bank of America, removed their rewards programs,
stopped offering certain types of accounts, or contemplated charging
customers for deposit accounts that previously were free.'o7  By
September 2011, Wells Fargo had begun testing a $3 a month debit card
usage fee in some states, 08 but by the beginning of November, Wells
102. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,437 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
103. See Maria Aspan, Small Banks Still Bracing for Durbin, Despite Exemption, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 6, 2011 [hereinafter Small Banks Bracing], available at
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_173/debit-interchange-exemption-free-
checking-small-banks-1041938-1.html; Citigroup, Bank of America struggling, UNITED
PRESS INT'L (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.upi.com/BusinessNews/2009/01/16/Citigroup-
Bank-of-America-struggling/UPI-10611232115107 (noting that regardless of this recent
regulation on interchange fees, banks have been struggling to maintain revenues in recent
times).
104. Small Banks Bracing, supra note 103.
105. Maria Aspan, Free Checking Thrives at Smaller Banks, Durbin Notwithstanding,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 29, 2011 [hereinafter Free Checking], available at
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_168/free-checking-durbin-debit-interchange-
1041641-1 .html?zkPrintable=1 &nopagination=1.
106. Id.; see also Sandra Block, Like Your Free Checking Account? Prepare To Say
Goodbye, USA TODAY (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/credit/story/2011-09-23/checking-account-
fees/50548182/1 (noting that banks are offering customers fewer free checking accounts and
have increased fees associated with checking accounts).
107. Free Checking, supra note 105.
108. Will Hernandez, Wells Fargo Tests a $3 Monthly Debit Card Fee in Five States,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 17, 2011, available at
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_160/wells-fargo-debit-fee-1041282-1 .html.
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Fargo ended this monthly fee test.109
However, because of intense public backlash, most banks have
backed off on proposed monthly charges for the use of debit cards. 1 o
Some banks have not completely removed fees, but instead have
changed the requirements to make it easier for consumers to avoid the
fees."' While these banks have made concessions because of consumer
backlash, some fear that banks will now make up the lost revenue in
less obvious ways'l 2 and that the proposed monthly fees were actually
better for consumers.113
For example, banks are now considering limiting the size of
transactions possible with their debit cards.' 14  These debit card
transaction caps would prevent customers from purchasing expensive
items with low intercl~ange fees.'"5 Both Bank of America and Chase
have threatened to limit debit transactions to somewhere between $50
and $ 100.1H6
109. Marcia Kaplan, Banks React to Durbin Amendment, PRACTICAL ECOMMERCE (NOV.
4, 2011), http://www.practicalecommerce.com/articles/3142-Banks-React-to-Durbin-
Amendment (noting that all banks, including SunTrust, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and
J.P. Morgan, that threatened to implement fees have backed off from that position).
110. See Martha C. White, Banks Back Off Unpopular Debit Card Fees, TIME
MONEYLAND (Oct. 31, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://moneyland.time.com/2011/10/29/banks-back-
off-unpopular-debit-card-fees/.
111. Id.
112. See Laurie Winslow, Banks Likely to Look for New Ways to Replenish Revenue,
TULSA WORLD (Nov. 13, 2011),
http://www.tulsaworld.com/business/article.aspx?subjectid=5 1 &articleid=20111113 51 El
ULNSan677104&allcom=1 (including raising existing fees or introductory rates on credit
cards). But see Claude R. Marx, Durbin Calls on CFPB to Mandate Checking Fee
Disclosures, CREDIT UNION TIMES (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://www.cutimes.com/2011/11/03/durbin-calls-on-cfpb-to-mandate-checking-fee-discl
(noting that Senator Durbin has asked the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to require
banks to disclose all fees related to checking accounts).
113. See Neil Weinberg, Why I Love Bank Fees and Regulators Should Too, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 4, 2012, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/Why-I-
Love-Bank-Fees-So-Should-Regulators-1045441-1.html (illustrating that the upfront fee
that many banks tried to charge customers is a much better method than the traditional
sneaky approach of indirect fees); Kalyan Nandy, Are Banks Charging You on the Sly?,
ZACHS INV. RESEARCH (Nov. 15, 2011),
http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/64682/Are+Banks+Charging+You+on+the+Sly%3F
(illustrating that some banks, such as Bank of America and Citi, have increased costs for
amenities associated with checking accounts that are less transparent than the proposed
upfront fees).
114. See R. Christian Bruce, Retailers Vow Challenge to Fed Debit Rule As Bankers,
Payment Firms Tweak Strategy, BANKING DAILY (BNA), July 1, 2011.
115. See id.
116. Chen, supra note 7.
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The purpose of putting a ceiling on the dollar amount of debit
card purchases is solely to help the bottom line of banks, as consumers
would be forced to use credit cards - which still carry higher
interchange fees - rather than debit cards for big ticket purchases.1 17
Thus, debit card issuers are actively trying to push customers from debit
cards to credit cards or prepaid debit cards.'18 These payment cards do
not fall under the Durbin Amendment's regulation of interchange
fees.119 An unseen battle is emerging between retailers that hope
consumers use debit cards because of low interchange fees and banks
hoping to push consumers to payment cards with higher fees. 120
E. Dilemma for Exempt Banks Post-Durbin Amendment
While larger banks are more willing to drop customer rewards
programs and add fees, small banks are hesitant to raise fees related to
checking accounts and debit cards. 121  Community banks and credit
unions simply "cannot afford to alienate customers by charging for
services that are now free."l 22  Free checking has allowed smaller
community banks and credit unions to set themselves apart from large
banks.123  Thus, smaller banks may have the chance to obtain new
customers who leave larger banks because of new fees.124
117. See Banks May Limit Debit Card Transaction Size to Fight Fee Limit, CREDIT CARD
PROCESSING BLOG (Mar. 14, 2011, 9:42 AM),
http://blog.unibulmerchantservices.com/banks-may-limit-debit-card-transaction-size-to-
fight-fee-limit/.
118. See Chen, supra note 7; Jim Kim, More Banks Push Customers to Credit Cards,
FIERCEFINANCE (Sept. 22, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://www.fiercefinance.com/story/more-
banks-push-customers-credit-cards/2011-09-22 (noting that Citi has sent more than 346
million card offers in North America and that almost 15 million new credit cards have been
issued in the first five months of 2011).
119. See Chen, supra note 7 (predicting that banks will "try to push customers toward
credit cards and prepaid debit cards, which escaped interchange fee regulation"); Daniel
F.C. Crowley et al., 5th Annual Judicial Symposium on Civil Justice Issues: George Mason
Judicial Education Program: Dec. 5-7, 2010: Edited Transcripts: Perspectives on Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Prot. Act, 7 J.L. EcoN & POL'Y 307, 319 (2010).
120. See Jean Chatzky, Debit Card Fees a Rising Issue as Banks Implement New
Charges for Cashless Exchanges, NYDALYNEWS.COM (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2011/09/21/2011-09-
21_land of the fee bank on it.html.
121. See Small Banks Bracing, supra note 103.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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However, small banks may have no choice but to change their
debit card issuing process to maintain efficiency. 1 25 These banks fear
that if they offer banking services below actual cost, such as free
checking, then fees will have be added to other products. 126 If forced to
drop their free checking programs, these banks believe that some low-
income customers may have to use check cashing or small loan firms
instead of the banking system. 127
Losing interchange fee income would have a significant impact
on smaller banks' ability to make enough profit to cover their debt card
programs.128 These smaller banks are concerned that costs will have to
be passed on to the consumer. 129  The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) is also worried that the interchange fee limitations
of the Durbin Amendment will cause smaller banks to recoup their
losses by charging customers more.130  The Durbin Amendment,
according to the FDIC, will put pressure on "community bank bottom
lines, as well as their competitive positions., 3 1
IV. THE DURBIN AMENDMENT'S POTENTIAL NEGATIVE IMPACT ON
SMALL BANKS
While most small banks are exempted from the debit
interchange fee ceiling, payment card networks are not required to
125. See Bruce, supra note 114.
126. See Letter from Mark S. White, President and CEO, Osage Fed. Bank, to Jennifer
Johnson, Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan. 31, 2011), available at
http://electronicpaymentscoalition.org/downloads/Osage%20Federal%2Bank.pdf.
127. See id.; Tim Chen, Why 7.7% ofAmericans Are Unbanked, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2011/01/03/why-7-percent-of-americans-are-
unbanked (demonstrating that the unbanked tend to be minorities that have been turned
away from banks in the past and now rely on alternative financial services, including cash
checking businesses payday loans, that can charge high levels of interest and are not FDIC-
insured).
128. See Letter from Karen Frilseth, Vice President Compliance, City and CountyCredit
Union, to Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan. 21,
2011), available at
http://electronicpaymentscoalition.org/downloads/City%20and%20County%2OCredit% 20 U
nion.pdf.
129. Id.
130. See Letter from Shelia C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 2 (Mar. 10, 2011)
[hereinafter FDIC Letter], available at
http://www.fsround.org/fsr/dodd-frank/pdfs/FDIClnterchangeCommentLetter3.10.11.pdf.
131. Id.
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create a two-tier debit card interchange fee structure. 132 The Fed has no
specific authority to require payment card networks to implement the
small bank exemption in any particular way.' 33  Ultimately, the
effectiveness of the Durbin Amendment's exemption is in the hands of
the payment card networks, especially Visa and MasterCard, and will
depend on whether they are willing to maintain two-tier interchange
structures long-term. 134
Smaller banks are afraid that networks, such as Visa and
MasterCard, will simply cap fees at the interchange fee of non-exempt
banks because of "market-driven factors not addressed" in the Fed's
final rule.135 While Visa acknowledged that a two-tier system would be
"hard to implement operationally," 36 the payment card network has
created an interchange fee structure for exempt and non-exempt
banks.137 MasterCard followed Visa's lead and announced in August
2011 plans for a two-tier interchange fee structure for exempt and non-
exempt banks.' 38  However, smaller banks still fear that even though
payment card networks have decided to establish two-tiered systems in
the abstract, the realities of maintaining this system will be too much 39
and that the true impact of the Durbin Amendment will not be
immediately felt.140  Presently, both MasterCard' 4 1 and Visa' 42 have
132. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,436 (July 20,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-
16861.
133. Id.
134. See Small Banks Bracing, supra note 103.
135. See FDIC Letter, supra note 130, at 1; The Durbin Amendment "Carve-Out" for
Small Banks and Credit Unions Will Not Work, ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS COALITION,
http://www.electronicpaymentscoalition.org/downloads/whythecarveoutwontwork21511 .pdf
(last visited Jan. 12, 2012) (noting that market pressure will result in one fixed rate being
applied to all issuers).
136. Visa Commits to a Two-Tier Debit Card Interchange Structure, DIGITAL
TRANSACTIONS (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/news/story/2861.
137. Sposito, supra note 17.
138. Small Banks Bracing, supra note 103.
139. See FDIC Letter, supra note 130; Trade Ass'n Letter, supra note 4, at 46.
140. See Small Banks Bracing, supra note 103; Andrew Jennings, Adapting to New
Interchange Rules on Debit Cards, FICO BANKING ANALYTICS BLOG, (Dec. 15 2011,
10:00AM), http://bankinganalyticsblog.fico.com/2011/12/adapting-to-new-interchange-
rules-on-debit-cards.html (demonstrating that experts believe that, within two or three
quarters, competitive market forces will force the interchange fees paid by exempt banks to
be closer to those paid by non-exempt banks).
141. MasterCard Worldwide: U.S. and Interregional Interchange Rates, MASTERCARD
WORLDWIDE, (Oct. 2011),
http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/MasterCardInterchange Rates-and Criteria.
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two-tiered interchange fee rates in place.
Nothing in the Durbin Amendment prevents payment card
networks from "unilaterally reduc[ing] interchange fees on credit unions
and banks."l 4 3  Without specific authority granted to the Fed,
MasterCard and Visa have wide latitude to adjust their fee structures to
maximize their own profits to the detriment of small banks.'" For
example, MasterCard and Visa have recently decided to raise the fees
that merchants have to pay for small debit purchases. 14 5 Merchants may
discourage customers from using debit cards for small purchases
because of these increased fees. 146  The payment card networks have
acknowledged that these changes for small value purchases are a
primarily a result of the Fed's final rule on the Durbin Amendment.14 7
Payment card networks are trying to "strike that right balance
between driving value to the consumer and the merchant on small
ticket" purchases. 14 8  Some merchants where small purchases are the
norm, such as coffee shops, have already had issues with the cap on
interchange fees. 14 9  While Visa and MasterCard had previously
pdf.
142. Visa U.S.A. Interchange Reimbursement Fees, VISA, (Oct. 2011),
http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-usa-interchange-reimbursement-fees-
october2011 .pdf.
143. Durbin Letter, supra note 5 (illustrating that small banks are fearful that Visa and
MasterCard may choose to use their market power against them).
144. See Trade Ass'n Letter, supra note 4, at 46; Eamon Murphy, How Durbin's Debit
Card Fee Backfired on Small Merchants, DAILYFINANCE (Dec. 8, 2011, 4:15PM),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/12/08/how-durbins-debit-card-fee-cut-backfired-on-
small-merchants (noting that MasterCard's president for U.S. markets said "[t]here will
always be some unhappy parties when the government gets in the way of the free-market
system").
145. See Andrew R. Johnson, MasterCard, Visa Raising Small Debit Buy Fees,
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 22, 2011, 3:11 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/mastercard-
visa-raising-small-debit-buy-fees-2011-09-22.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. See Durbin Amendment has Unintended Consequences for Some Businesses,
CREDIT CARD PROCESSING (Dec. 14, 2011, 11:19 AM),
http://www.creditcardprocessing.net/durbin-amendment-has-unintended-consequences-for-
some-businesses/ (noting that before the Durbin Amendment, merchants only paid between
six and seven cents of interchange for a one dollar transaction, but now must pay the
maximum fee of around twenty one cents and also that while bigger businesses may be able
to directly negotiate with payment networks to get better fees, smaller businesses do not do
enough business to influence MasterCard or Visa); Emily Jed, USAT Ends MasterCard
Debit Transactions, VENDING TIMES (Dec. 6, 2011),
http://www.vendingtimes.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=EB79A487112B48A296B38C81345C
8C7F&nm=Vending+Features&type=Publishing&mod=Publications::Article&mid=8F3A7
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provided special pricing for small-amount debit transactions, these
payment card networks have now set interchange fees at the maximum
amount allowed under the Durbin Amendment even for small
purchases.150 Therefore, while the two-tiered structure seems to be in
place, changes can swiftly happen as merchants, consumers, debit card
issuers, and payment card networks must deal with the consequences of
regulating interchange fees.' 5'
The Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has stated that the
Fed is not exactly sure how effective the exemption will be for smaller
banks.152  These uncertainties emerge because multiple factors will
affect the exemption's functionality and cost-effectiveness for both
payment card networks and merchants.153 While the Fed adopted its
final rule after Visa - which processes more than eighty percent of debit
card volume - announced its intention to have a two-tiered fee structure,
the Fed still lacks the regulatory power to compel payment networks to
maintain these structures long-term.154
Payment card networks also have expressed issues with
differentiating between a card issued by an exempt bank and a card
from a non-exempt bank because smaller bank-issued cards use the
same Bank Identification Numbers (BINs) as larger banks. 55
According to Visa CEO Byron Pollitt, his company "do[es] not have the
capacity to differentiate those BINs at the point of sale." 56 Because of
027421841978Fl8BE895F87F791&tier=4&id=7DFA2EC87D29460DA1E632840193C153
(demonstrating that the hard cap on interchange fees has a disproportionate impact on
merchants who sell products for less than $11).
150. Jennings, supra note 140 (illustrating that some convenience stores and fast food
restaurants have begun asking customer not to use debit cards as a method of payment); see
also Another Durbin Amendment Side Effect Gets the Limelight, CREDIT CARD PROCESSING
BLOG (Dec. 12, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://blog.unibuhmerchantservices.com/another-durbin-
amendment-side-effect-gets-the-limelight.
151. See Johnson, supra note 145; Thecla Fabian, Fed Ignores Competitive Impact
Analysis Required for Interchange Rule, Experts Say, BANKING DAILY (BNA), Mar. 8, 2011
(stating that the Federal Reserve has not prepared a competitive impact analysis of the
interchange fee regulation).
152. See Trade Ass'n Letter, supra note 4, at 47.
153. See id.
154. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,436 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
155. See Small Institutions to Durbin Amendment: Thanks, But No Thanks, DIGITAL
TRANSACTIONS (June 9, 2010),
http://www.digitaltransactions.net/index.php/news/story/2551.
156. Id.
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this inability, payment card networks will have to solve this problem
before implementing any two-tiered interchange fee structure.157  An
alternative - to "simply issue new cards with specific BINs to smaller
institutions" - has been dismissed as cost-prohibitive.158 Thus, payment
card networks have been forced to develop the ability to identify exempt
debit cards when exempt banks use the same BINs and agents as larger
issuers of debit cards.159  However, some have claimed that payment
card networks overstated these issues as a tactic to make credit unions
and non-exempt banks continue to lobby Congress to not implement the
Durbin Amendment.160
The goal of the Durbin Amendment is to set interchange fees at
a level reasonable for merchants.161  However, small banks are
concerned that merchants will pick and choose which card they accept
in order to minimize larger interchange fees.162  Even with major
payment card networks adopting two-tier interchange fee structures,
merchants may merely decide to make consumers not use debit cards
issued by smaller bank debit cards. 163
Although small banks are nervous, the Fed has assured these
banks that no part of the Durbin Amendment can be interpreted to allow
any person or merchant to discriminate between debit cards based on
the card's issuer.' 64  Merchants would face a negative backlash from
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See California Bankers Association Compliance Bulletin, Analysis of Dodd-Frank
Act: The Durbin Amendment (Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation) (Aug. 16, 2010),
bttp://www.calbankers.com/compliance-bulletin/analysis-dodd-frank-act-durbin-
amendment-debit-card-interchange-fee-regulation.
160. Sposito, supra note 17.
161. See Durbin Letter, supra note 5.
162. See id.; Robin Sidel, Debit-Fee Cap Has Nasty Side Effect, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204319004577084613307585768.html
(noting that Dairy Queen has told franchises to steer customers away from using their debit
cards as a method of payment, especially for purchases under $10).
163. Martin Baily & Robert E. Litan, Toward Reasonable Regulation of Debit Card
Interchange Fees: The Case for Modifying the Fed's December 16, 2010 Proposals, THE
FINANCIAL SERVICES ROUNDTABLE (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://www.fsround.org/fsr/dodd frank/pdfs/ReasonablelnterchangeFeeRegulationExecutive
Summary.pdf. But see Durbin Letter, supra note 5 (stating that the Durbin Amendment
requires a merchant who accepts a debit card from a large bank to also accept a debit card
from small banks and credit unions).
164. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,436 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235), available at
http://federalregister.gov/a/2011-16861.
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customers if they refused to accept debit cards from certain banks. 165
The merchant's top priority is not minimizing debit card interchange
fees, but instead to make as many sales as possible.' 66 No portion of the
Durbin Amendment explicitly allows merchants to treat bank issuers
differently.167
V. THE FUTURE OF THE DURBIN AMENDMENT
The implementation of the Fed's final rule has created a great
deal of complaints from consumers and from Congress,168 and even
from merchants - the group the Amendment was supposed to help.169
Backlash from customers has already resulted in non-exempt banks
backing off of the idea of proposed monthly fees for debit card use.170
Customers were upset with banks charging usage fees for their existing
checking accounts and debit cards.' 7' Additionally, customers may not
see any benefits in the form of lower prices from merchants.172 Despite
165. Id.
166. See Andrew Kahr, Never Mind the Lobbyists, Durbin Amendment Helps Small
Banks, AM. BANKER, Mar. 3, 2011, available at
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/never-mind-the-lobbyists-durbin-amendment-
helps-small-banks-1033898-1.html (demonstrating that selective acceptance of cards by
merchants has been an extremely rare occurrence).
167. See Small Banks and the Durbin Amendment, supra note 100, at 3.
168. Halah Touryalai, New Bill Aims to Kill Durbin's Debt Card Fees, FORBES (Oct. 13,
2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2011/10/13/new-bill-could-kill-durbins-
debit-card-fees.
169. Ernest Patrikis, Both the Merchants and the Fed Misread Durbin, AM. BANKER,
Dec. 15, 2011, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/both-the-merchants-
and-the-fed-misread-durbin-1044930-1.html (noting that a group of retailers and retail
associations have brought suit against Fed because requirements of the Durbin Amendment
are 'arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion'); see also Retailers Taking Legal
Action Against Federal Reserve over Durbin Amendment, CREDIT CARD PROCESSING (Dec.
23, 2011, 11:53 AM), http://www.creditcardprocessing.net/retailers-taking-legal-action-
against-federal-reserve-over-durbin-amendment/.
170. Kalyan Nandy, BofA Calls Off Debit-Card Fee, ZACKS INVESTMENT RESEARCH
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/63909/BofA+Calls+Off+Debit-
Card+Fee.
171. Maria Aspan, Wells Fargo Abandons Debit-Fee Plans Amid Backlash, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 28, 2011, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_2 10/wells-
fargo-debit-card-fees-checking-bank-of-america-1043641-1.html.
172. Fast Facts: Impact of the Durbin Amendment for Consumers, THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES ROUNDTABLE (Nov. 2011), www.fsround.org/fsr/pdfs/fast-facts/2011-11-16-
impactdurbinamendmentconsumers.pdf (noting that merchants are not legally required to
pass on savings from the Durbin Amendment to consumers and that forty-one percent of
merchants reported they will not pass on lower debit card costs to consumers); see also
David Morrison, New Research Charges Retailers With Pocketing Interchange,
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these consumer complaints, debit cards continue to help banks' bottom
lines and play an important part in bringing customers into banks, and
thus, banks will work within the new regulations to maintain their debit
card programs.' 73
With much of the focus on customer issues with non-exempt
banks, the bipartisan Consumer Debit Card Protection Act' 74 has been
introduced in the House of Representatives and would repeal the Durbin
Amendment because of its harmful impact on customers and banks.175
The bill has currently been referred to the House Financial Services
committee, as well as the House Financial Services' Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit.'7 6  However, while
customer protests were successful in getting non-exempt banks to
change course, the bill may have a difficult time receiving the sixty
votes needed for approval in the Senate.' 77
Groups, such as the Merchants Payment Coalition, oppose a
possible repeal of the Durbin Amendment, claiming that members of
Congress are in the pocket of big banks.' 78  However, the American
Bankers Association has come out in support of the bill asserting that
government price-fixing has merely transferred the cost of items from
retailers to consumers.' Others in support of the repeal of the Durbin
Amendment argue that the Amendment inaccurately measures the cost
of debit cards by each transaction, and that debit card transactions are
actually advantageous for merchants.'so
CREDITUNION TImEs (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.cutimes.com/2011/12/09/new-research-
charges-retailers-with-pocketing-inte (demonstrating that consumers are paying more for
items after the implementation of the Durbin Amendment).
173. Kate Fitzgerald, Debit Still Drives Overall Profits, Big Bank Execs Say, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 4, 2011, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_215/debit-
card-profitability-formula-pricing-durbin-1043831-1.html.
174. 157 CONG. REC. H6853 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2011).
175. Touryalai, supra note 168.
176. 157 CONG. REC. H6853 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2011).
177. See Kevin Wack, New Anti-Durbin Effort Starts in House, AM. BANKER, Oct. 12,
2011, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_1 98/durbin-amendment-
repeal-bill-jason-chaffetz-1043095-1.html (noting that it was unclear whether the bill would
lead to a serious push in Congress to repeal the Durbin Amendment).
178. Touryalai, supra note 168.
179. Id.
180. Richard A. Epstein, Dick's Debit-card Dud, New YORK POST (Oct. 6, 2011, 4:26
AM),
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/dickdebitcarddud_wlVfZwHwJ
TR79g8s8goO6H (noting that the Amendment also causes perverse market dynamics
because large banks are forced to raise fees and lose customers or keep fees low and lose
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While attempts to repeal his amendment are ongoing,' Senator
Durbin has attempted to strengthen the small bank exemption by
directing the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to report on the success
of the exemption.' 82 The language of FTC oversight was inserted into a
regulatory funding bill, which was passed by the Senate.'3 The FTC
report would discuss whether the payment card networks are preventing
exempt banks from competing with non-exempt and whether the
networks are working together with non-exempt banks in an anti-
competitive fashion.' 84  However, because the provision was merely
report language, the FTC's report about the success of the small bank
exemption and any evidence of collusion would have no legal effect.'85
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fed's final rule on the Durbin Amendment became
effective October 1, 2011. As a result, it is not yet clear how issuing
banks and merchants will respond. So far, many large banks have
decided not to eliminate free checking for their customers, and the
payment networks have committed to a two-tiered fee structure to
accommodate smaller banks not subject to the interchange fee cap.
While the Durbin Amendment exempts banks with less than $10 billion
in worldwide assets from the fee cap, the lack of authority for the Fed to
mandate a two-tier interchange fee system increases the possibility that
this exemption will be ineffective. If the Fed had interpreted the Durbin
Amendment to give them this regulatory power, many of the issues that
small banks have with the exemption would be eliminated. While the
revenue on each transaction).
181. Bold Predictions, Part I - Durbin Rewrites Durbin, AM. BANKER, December 29,
2011, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/Bold-Predictions-2012-
Durbin-Rewrites-His-Rule-1045289-
1.html?ET=americanbanker:e9273:2295048a:&st-email&utm source=editorial&utm medi
um=email&utm-campaign=AB_Intraday_010312 (illustrating that some experts believe
that the Durbin Amendment will either be repealed or rewritten in 2012).
182. Kevin Wack, Durbin Seeks To Beef Up Small-Bank Interchange Exemption, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 1, 2011, available at
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/1 76_212/durbin-interchange-debit-fee-ftc-collusion-
1043734-1.html.
183. Id.
184. Id. (noting that Durbin may trust the FTC more than the Fed to be tough on
payment card networks and large banks).
185. See Congress Reaches Appropriation Agreement, AM. BANKERs Ass'N (Dec. 16,
2011), http://regreformtracker.aba.com/2011/12/congress-reaches-appropriations.html.
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Fed rightly has placed itself in charge of publishing lists of exempt
banks and monitoring annually the progress of its final rule, it should
have extended its authority to regulate the two-tier interchange structure
within its regulatory power. It is illogical that the Durbin Amendment
would attempt to regulate an industry that has greatly lacked regulation,
but then back off when it is possible to really make the Durbin
Amendment's goal a reality. In passing the Durbin Amendment,
Congress has decided to interfere with free market in setting a
maximum interchange fee, but has not reserved the power to regulate
the payment card networks in establishing and maintaining a two-tiered
system.
Therefore, the ultimate success of this exemption depends on
the payment card networks, especially Visa and MasterCard that have
dominated the debit card market, living up to what they have promised.
Senator Durbin has increased the likelihood of these payment card
networks playing by the rules through the inclusion of an FTC report on
the effectiveness of the small bank exemption. However, these payment
card networks can still decide, based on any number of factors, to
destroy at any time the exemption's purpose and intent by abandoning a
two-tier interchange fee model. While the Fed did make its final rule
less drastic than originally proposed, the Fed will regret not giving itself
more strength to force payment card networks to maintain the small
banks exemption in the post-Durbin financial landscape.
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